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THE DEATH OF COMPARABLE WORTH: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION IN WARDS COVE
PACKING CO. v. A TONIO
I. INTRODUCTION
A man and a woman enter college at the same time. She majors in
nursing, he in pharmacy. Upon graduation, each accepts a job at a large
hospital, she as a beginning nurse, he as a beginning pharmacist.
Although these jobs have a comparable value to the hospital, the woman
earns 32% less than the man. I
After finishing high school, a woman attends a junior college and ob-
tains a two-year degree in secretarial science. Upon graduation, she ac-
cepts ajob as a secretary in a trucking firm. Although her boss admits that
he could not run the business without her, she is paid 27% less than an
1. See WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, IT PAYS To BE A MAN: AN OVERVIEW OF
COMPARABLE WORTH 2 (1985) [hereinafter WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND]. The Wo-
men's Legal Defense Fund compiled the following statistics to illustrate that occupations dom-
inated by women command a substantially lower salary than male-dominated occupations.
The statistics show the type of wage discrimination which continues to affect working women
in the United States. See also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SERIES P-70, No. 10, MEAN
HOURLY EARNINGS OF FEMALE FULL-TIME WORKERS 23-26 (1987).
Average Percentage
Position Annual Pay of Females
Nurse $17,000 96%
Pharmacist 25,000 16
Secretary 12,000 99
Truck Driver 16,300 2
Seamstress 8,200 97
Plumber 21,000 0
Registered Nurse 17,300 96
Airline Pilot 27,600 0
Housekeeper 5,600 95
Janitor 11,400 15
Child Care 7,900 87
Mail Carrier 21,100 12
Food Server 7,800 85
Butcher 16,400 7
Retail Sales Clerk 9,300 60
Sales Associate 15,000 12
WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra, at 2.
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entry level truck driver in the same firm.2
A woman decides to get a job after raising her family. She accepts a
job as a hotel housekeeper. In the same hotel, several men are employed as
janitors. The woman is responsible for cleaning the rooms, while the men
must clean the grounds of the hotel. Even though their jobs are compara-
ble, the woman earns 51% less than the men.3
Although outlawed by Congress over twenty years ago,4 sex-based
wage discrimination continues to be a persistent problem for working
women in the United States.' Despite legislative efforts,6 on the average,
women still earn sixty-four cents for every dollar earned by men.'
Virtually every occupation has some degree of wage disparity be-
tween male and female employees;' however, wage disparities are great-
est in occupations dominated by women.9 In spite of this, federal law
currently does not provide a remedy for pay inequities between jobs that
are not identical, but merely comparable.' 0 Title VII provides equal ac-
cess to employment opportunities," and once a person is employed, the
Equal Pay Act assures that all employees performing equal work are paid
the same wage.' 2 However, neither Title VII nor the Equal Pay Act ex-
pressly prohibits an employer from paying employees in male-dominated
job categories a higher salary than employees in female-dominated job
categories, even if the female-dominated jobs have an equal, or greater,
2. WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 1, at 2.
3. Id. These three hypotheticals are based on statistics compiled by the Women's Legal
Defense Fund, supra note 1, and are designed to illustrate the type of wage discrimination
which continues to infect the work place.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988) (enacted in 1963); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (enacted
in 1964).
5. Franklin, Wage Gap Still Hasn't Been Bridged, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 8, 1989, § C, at
2, col. 2.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988), commonly referred to as the Equal Pay Act, prohibits
employers from discriminating on the basis of sex. The Act forbids employers from paying
members of one sex less than members of the opposite sex performing the same work. Id, The
anti-employment discrimination portion of Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to dis-
criminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin with respect to compensa-
tion, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
7. Franklin, supra note 5. See also Brogan, Group Seeks to Close Pay Gap Between Sexes,
The Providence J. Bull., Aug. 29, 1988, § E, at 1, col. 2.
8. Quinn, Comparable Pay for Comparable Work, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16, 1984, at 66 (ac-
counting for experience, education and other factors which might command higher wage, wo-
men still earn less than men).
9. See supra note I and accompanying text.
10. The Equal Pay Act prohibits unequal pay for the same work. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(I)
(1988). Although Title VII prohibits wage discrimination, it is unclear whether it includes
claims for work which is merely comparable, but not equal. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
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value to the employer. 3
The doctrine of "comparable worth" emerged as a way to bridge
this gap in the existing federal law."4 Comparable worth refers to a sal-
ary system based upon equal pay for dissimilar jobs that have an equal
value to employers or society.' 5 Claims based upon this doctrine cannot
be brought under the Equal Pay Act, because the Equal Pay Act only
prohibits wage discrimination among workers performing the same job. 6
Instead, comparable-worth claims must be brought under -Title VII,
which prohibits all forms of employment discrimination, without the re-
quirement that the jobs in question be equivalent..7
Even though setting salaries according to their cqmparable worth is
a way to equalize pay dispaiities between, male-dominated and female-
dominated jobs," the doctrine has had little.success as a litigation tool.19
Many courts confronted with Title VII claims based on the doctrine of
comparable worth have held that salary decisions are "subjective" rather
than "objective" in nature, and because subjective employment decisions
involve several complex factors, such decisions are not the kind of em-
ployment practices Title VII seeks to proscribe.20 Therefore, these courts
have held that such claims are not actionable under Title VII. 1l
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co. 22 held that subjective employ-
ment decisions could form the basis of a Title VII claim, provided the
plaintiff could prove that the defendant's subjective employment prac-
tices had a discriminatory impact upon employees protected by Title
VII.2  Although Wards Cove involved a claim of racial discrimination,24
13. The Equal Pay Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988), provides that employees
performing equal work be paid equally. Title VII ensures that all employees have equal access
to employment opportunities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
14. See generally BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., PAY EQUITY AND COMPARABLE
WORTH 1 (1984).
15. Id.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). See also infra notes 29-58 and accompanying text.
18. Brogan, supra note 7. See also WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 1, at 1.
19. See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Lemons v. Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888
(1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). See also infra notes 59-79 and
accompanying text.
21. Lemons, 620 F.2d at 230; Christensen, 563 F.2d at 356-57.
22. 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
23. Id. at 1485. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). Therefore, if an individual falls into one of-these
categories, that individuatlis considered a member of a protected class. Wards Cove, 810 F.2d
at 1480.
24. Wards Cove, 810 F.2d at 1479.
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the circuit court did not limit its holding to the facts of the case. There-
fore, because wage discrimination claims involve subjective employment
practices, this pro-employee holding momentarily cracked open the door
to Title VII claims based upon the doctrine of comparable worth.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certio-
rari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wards Cove.25 Although
the Supreme Court affirmed that subjective employment decisions could
form the basis of a Title VII disparate-impact claim,26 the Court ex-
tended the plaintiff's prima facie burden of proof so far that it virtually
foreclosed the possibility of presenting a valid disparate-impact claim,
particularly in cases based on the theory of comparable worth."
This Note analyzes the United States. Supreme Court's decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio2  and the effect this decision will have
on Title VII disparate-impact claims in general. This Note will also ana-
lyze the effect of the Wards Cove decision on Title VII disparate-impact
claims based on the doctrine of comparable worth and will determine
whether Wards Cove has struck a death-blow to the'use of the compara-
ble-worth doctrine as a viable way to seek legal remedies for wage dispar-
ities between men and women.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a broad body of anti-discrimination
legislation2 9 consisting of ten titles which individually address voting
rights, housing, education and employment."0 Title VII of the Act ad-
dresses employment practices.31 This title makes it unlawful for an em-
ployer to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in hiring, promotions, discharge, compensation, or any
other term or condition of employment.3 2 Title VII also prohibits em-
25. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121 (1989).
26. Id. at 2124 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2788
(1989), which recognized that subjective employment decisions could form basis of disparate-
impact claim).
27. The Court does not say that a disparate-impact claim is foreclosed by this decision, but
the rulings in Wards Cove will have that effect. See infra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
28. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
29. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2393-94.
30. See id. at 4, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, at 2394-409, for a
general discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its origins.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) provides:
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ployers from limiting employment opportunities by segregating or classi-
fying an employee based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.33
Title VII does not prohibit all differences in compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment.34 Differences based on a bona
fide seniority or merit system, differences measured by quantity or qual-
ity of production, or differences based on work locations are sanctioned
by Title VII, provided the employer is not intentionally discriminating
against a category of employees protected by Title VII.
35
Although Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which in-
cludes Title VII, primarily to protect blacks from racial discrimination,
Title VII's reach extends far beyond protection from racial discrimina-
tion in the work place.3 6 Even though Congress added gender to Title
VII almost as an afterthought,37 protection from gender discrimination
enjoys the same level of protection under Title VII as does racial
discrimination.3
B. Prima Facie Employment Discrimination Under Title VII
Plaintiffs alleging violations of Title VII may establish a prima facie
case under either of two theories: disparate treatment or disparate im-
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
33. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.
35. Id.
36. Title VII also prohibits discrimination based on color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
37. See Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MiNN.
L. REv. 877, 880-82 (1967) (gender added on last day of House floor debates).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
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pactO9  The'critical element-in a disparate-treatment claim is the em-
ployer's intent, while disparate-impact claims focus on the effects of a
particular employment practice.14'
-isparate treatment
Title VII dlaims based upon adigparate-treatment'theory require the
plaintiff to prove that the defeidanf'intefftiqnall chose certain employ-
ment pradtices to discdimiiate against employees who fall within a cate-
gory protected:by;'Title VII.' Uider cortain circumstances the court
may infer a disiriminatotyintent, 42 -but the mere fact that an employer
knew of the discriminatory impact of particular employment decisions
does iot pgove.dis~iminato intent;4 ,. "
Once a plaintiff has-proven discriininatory intent, the burden of pro-
ducing eontiay evidimn shiftk: to thd emphqyer -who must articulate
some legitimiate~i onxdisenrmirihatory . reasoin for the employment prac-
tice. , TheempoYer.&ed only produceevidterle that the challenged em-
ploynient dedsion'srek-a -legitimate business p .urpose and is not based
upon a-desire'o dscriminate.41 'If the empl6yer meets this burden, the
39. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1480 (9th Cir. 1987) (en bane),
rev'd, 109^S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
40. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). In
Teamsters, the United States Supreme Court defined disparate treatment as, "simply treat[ing]
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Id. The Court stated that "[u]ndoubtedly
disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title
VII." Id.
In the same opinion, the Court defined disparate impact as, "employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." Id. The Court stated
that proof of discriminatory motive is not required under a disparate-impact theory. Id.
41. See, e.g., American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770
F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff must prove employer chose particular employment
policy because of policy's effect on members of protected class).
42. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If a plaintiff: (i) be-
longs to a protected classification; (ii) applied and was qualified for the job in question; (iii)
though qualified, was rejected for the job by the employer; and (iv) the defendant continued to
seek applicants with the same qualifications as plaintiff, the court may infer that the employer
intended to discriminate against the plaintiff, thereby allowing the plaintiff to prove a prima
facie case of disparate-treatment discrimination. Id.
43. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 901
(1980) (to prove discriminatory intent, plaintiff must establish that particular employment
practice was chosen because of its effect on protected class, not in spite of it). See also Ameri-
can Fed'n, 770 F.2d at 1405 (showing of employer's awareness of adverse consequences of
chosen employment practices insufficient to prove intent under disparate-treatment theory).
44. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
45. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978) ("Title VII prohibits [the
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plaintiff must prove that the employer's justification is merely a pretext
for intentional discrimination." Under the disparate-treatment theory,
the plaintiff retains the burden of persuading the fact finder that the de-
fendant's discriminatory conduct was intentional. 7
2. Disparate impact
Plaintiffs may also make out a prima facie case of Title VII employ-
ment discrimination if the employment practice, though neutral on its
face, proves discriminatory in application."a Under the disparate-impact
theory, the plaintiff need not prove intent. Rather, courts will infer dis-
criminatory intent from employment practices which disproportionately
hurt employees who fall within a class protected by Title VII.49 The
United States Supreme Court has held that "good intent" or the absence
of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures which
operate as "built-in headwinds" against minority groups.50 The Court
has held that Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."5'
To prove a Title VII violation under the theory of disparate impact,
the plaintiff must first identify the employment practice claimed to have
caused the harm. 2 Next, the plaintiff must establish that the employ-
ment practice adversely affected members of a suspect class.5 3 Once the
plaintiff has made this prima facie showing, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the employer who must prove that the challenged practice was
either not discriminatory, or was the result of an overriding business
necessity.
54
The burden on a defendant in a disparate-impact suit is substantially
greater than in a disparate-treatment case. Under the disparate-treat-
ment theory, an employer can rebut the plaintiff's prima facie showing
employer] from having as a goal a work force selected by any proscribed discriminatory prac-
tice, but it does not impose a duty to adopt a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of minor-
ity employees.").
46. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
47. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 & n.6 (1981).
48. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; American Fed'n, 770 F.2d at 1405.
49. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977) (statutory height and weight
requirements had disproportionate impact on women applicants for positions as prison
guards); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (diploma and intelligence test
requirements had disproportionate impact on blacks).
50. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
51. Id. at 431.
52. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
53. See id. at 328-29; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
54. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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by merely producing evidence of a business necessity." However, under
the disparate-impact model, once the plaintiff has made a prima facie
showing, the burden of persuasion shifts from the plaintiff to the defend-
ant. 6 Consequently, the defendant must prove that the chosen employ-
ment practice was not the result of prohibited employment
discrimination, rather than merely producing evidence of a legitimate
business interest.57
If an employer successfully rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case,
the plaintiff has one final chance to prevail under the disparate-impact
model. To do so, the plaintiff must show that a less discriminatory em-
ployment practice would equally serve the employer's business needs.
Such a showing would be evidence that the employer's chosen practice is
merely a pretext for discrimination. 8
C. Disparate-Impact Claims and Subjective Employment Decisions
Traditionally, plaintiffs have used subjective employment decisions
as evidence of discriminatory intent in disparate-treatment cases.59 Until
recently, subjective employment decisions have had little to do with a
disparate-impact analysis.' The disparate-impact model developed as a
method to combat objective employment practices, such as standardized
intelligence tests, height and weight requirements, or useless educational
requirements which tended to disproportionately disadvantage minorities
and women.61 Over the last two decades, plaintiffs have attempted to use
the disparate-impact model to challenge subjective employment decisions
55. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
56. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
57. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 n.5 (recognizing difference in proof for disparate-impact
claim); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 (employer must "proved that the challenged requirements are
job related"). The Ninth Circuit has held that the crucial difference between a disparate-treat-
ment and a disparate-impact allegation is the burden on the employer. Wards Cove, 810 F.2d
at 1485. To refute plaintiff's prima facie showing, the defendant-employer must do more than
articulate a business reason; the defendant must prove the business necessity of the practice.
lId
58. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
59. See, eg., O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, 670 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff denied
promotion); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1046 (10th Cir. 1981) (panel denied plaintiff su-
pervisory position).
60. Bauer, 647 F.2d at 1046 (use of subjective criteria not discriminatory where defendant
articulates specific, legitimate reasons for decision).
61. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 427 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
1490 [Vol. 23:1483
June 1990] WARDS COVE PACKING CO. v. ATONIO 1491
as well.6 2 These attempts have met with varying results.63
Subjective employment decisions take many forms and can encom-
pass entire employment policies. Examples of subjective employment de-
cisions include recruiting and hiring procedures,' promotion and
termination policies,6" and compensation systems.66 The Ninth Circuit
has even recognized an employer's failure to use objective employment
procedures as a type of subjective employment practice which falls
within the disparate-impact model.67
Lower federal courts have divided on the issue of whether subjective
employment decisions can form the basis of a Title VII disparate-impact
claim.6" Circuit courts favoring the theory have relied on Title VII's leg-
islative history which indicates that Congress expressly intended case law
existing at the time of the congressional debates to govern Title VII's
application.6 9 Even though Congress did not expressly extend the dispa-
rate-impact model to subjective employment practices in these debates,
case law at the time of the debates upheld disparate-impact challenges to
subjective employment decisions.70
62. See Regner v. Chicago, 789 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1986); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic
Co., Numerical Control, 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th
Cir. 1977).
63. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
64. See Rowe, 690 F.2d at 93.
65. See Regner, 789 F.2d at 573.
66. See Christensen, 563 F.2d at 356.
67. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc),
rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
68. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have allowed
Title VII disparate-impact claims to be based upon subjective employment decisions. See
Wards Cove, 810 F.2d at 1478 (Ninth Circuit applied disparate-impact analysis to charges of
word-of-mouth recruitment, nepotism, rehire preferences and promotion discrimination);
Regner, 789 F.2d at 537 (Seventh Circuit held disparate impact theory applied in case chal-
lenging employer's promotion policies); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1523 (1 lth Cir. 1985)
(disparate-impact analysis applied to allegedly discriminatory promotion policy); Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1273-88 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disparate-impact cause of action applied to
discriminatory performance reviews), cert. denied sub nor. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985); Rowe, 690 F.2d at 93 (Sixth Circuit allowed disparate-impact cause of action to be
applied in case involving challenges to rehire practices).
The Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have not allowed subjective employment decisions
to form the basis of a disparate-impact claim. Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795,
801 (5th Cir. 1982) (court refused to allow disparate-impact cause of action in case involving
alleged discriminatory promotion practice); Lemons v. Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir.
1978) (subjective decision to base salaries on competitive market not violation of Title VII),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen, 563 F.2d at 356 (Eighth Circuit held employer's
subjective decision to base salaries on competitive market does not establish prima facie case of
Title VII employment discrimination).
69. See, eg., Wards Cove, 810 F.2d at 1482-83.
70. See, eg., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1971)
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Circuit courts refusing to allow subjective employment decisions to
form the basis of disparate-impact claims have reasoned that the effect of
subjective employment decisions is unpredictable; therefore, plaintiffs
cannot satisfactorily prove that these decisions detrimentally affected
members of a protected class.7 Also, these courts feared that allowing
such a challenge might require employers to justify each stage in every
employment process which could unduly burden businesses and vastly
increase Title VII litigation. 2
Recently, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,73 the United States
Supreme Court settled this debate by holding that subjective employment
decisions could form the basis of a disparate-impact challenge under Ti-
tle VII;74 however, the majority diluted the pro-plaintiff effect of this rul-
ing by substantially increasing a disparate-impact plaintiff's prima facie
burden of proof. The Court held that in order to make out a prima facie
case of disparate-impact discrimination challenging a subjective employ-
ment decision, a plaintiff must first prove a disparity within the em-
ployer's workforce.7" Next, the plaintiff must identify the specific
employment practices (subjective or objective) responsible for the alleged
disparity, and prove that each practice had a significantly disparate im-
pact.76 Additionally, the Court altered the traditional burdens of proof
by requiring a disparate-impact plaintiff to retain the ultimate burden of
persuasion at all times throughout the case.7 7
Although Wards Cove involved a case of racial discrimination,78 the
decision applies to all Title VII disparate-impact claims.79 This decision
will have the effect of making it far more difficult to challenge any form
of employment discrimination under the disparate-impact model, and
will be particularly devastating to claims involving the doctrine of com-
parable worth. The following discussion sets forth the reasoning of the
Wards Cove majority and dissenting opinions; analyzes these opinions as
they relate to disparate-impact claims generally; and concludes by apply-
(court applied Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), to invalidate subjective hiring
practices, even though Griggs involved challenge to objective hiring criteria).
71. See, e.g., Pouncy, 668 F.7d at 801-02.
72. Id. at 802.
73. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
74. Id. at 2124 (applying holding in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct.
2777, 2788 (1988), which involved subjective employment decisions).
75. Id.
76. Id at 2124-25.
77. Id. at 2126 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2790
(1988), where Court evenly divided on this issue).
78. Id. at 2120.
79. Id. at 2121.
1492 [Vol. 23:1483
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ing the majority's holdings to a Title VII disparate-impact claim based
on the doctrine of comparable worth.
III. WARDS COVE PACKING CO. V. ATONIC
A. The Facts
Notorious for severe employment discrimination, the Alaskan
salmon canning industry allowed discriminatory employment practices
to infect its work place.8 0 In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,8 1 can-
nery workers from several Alaskan salmon canneries filed a class action
suit against their employers, alleging racial discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.82 They claimed that the can-
neries' use of separate hiring channels for cannery and non-cannery
jobs, 3 word-of-mouth recruitment, nepotism, preferential rehire policies
and the canneries' lack of objective job qualifications permanently rele-
gated non-white workers to the lowest paying jobs with no chance for
80. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun characterized the salmon industry's em-
ployment practices as "tak[ing] us back to a kind of overt and institutionalized discrimination
we have not dealt with in years: a total residential and work environment organized on princi-
ples of racial stratification and segregation, which... resembles a plantation economy." Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
82. Id. at 2120. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e-2(a) (1988).
83. The canneries have two general job classifications: cannery jobs and non-cannery jobs.
Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2119. Cannery jobs are classified by the canneries as unskilled and
non-cannery jobs are classified as skilled and semi-skilled. Id The vast majority of unskilled
cannery jobs are filled by Native Alaskans from Alaskan villages, or through a local chapter of
the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union whose membership is heavily
Filipino. Id. Non-cannery jobs are filled primarily by white workers hired through the com-
panies' home offices in Washington and Oregon. Id. Salmon canneries operate only in the
summer months during the salmon runs. Id.
Virtually all the cannery jobs paid less than the non-cannery jobs. Id. at 2119-20. Work
on the cannery line is very intense. Id. at 2119. Because salmon are highly perishable, they
must be processed soon after they are caught. Id Independent fish companies catch the
salmon and immediately sell them to cannery-owned boats which transport the fish to the
canneries. Id. at 2119 n.2. Once the fish arrive at the canneries, cannery workers must eviscer-
ate the fish, pull out the eggs, clean the fish and put them in cans. Id Fish are canned at the
rate of four cans per second. Id. The canned salmon are cooked within precise time and
temperature requirements established by the FDA. Id. Cannery workers must also inspect the
cans to ensure that they are properly sealed. Id.
Non-cannery jobs include machinists and engineers to maintain the cannery equipment,
quality control personnel to oversee the FDA-required inspections and recordkeeping, crews
to operate the vessels used to transport the salmon to the canneries, beach gangs for dock yard
labor and construction, and other personnel to operate the cannery community, such as cooks,
carpenters, store-keepers, and bookkeepers. Id. at 2119 n.3. These jobs were filled predomi-
nately with white employees and, in all cases, received a higher rate of pay. Id. at 2119-20.
The canneries classified these positions as skilled or semi-skilled. Id. at 2119.
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In addition to job stratification, the workers also claimed that the
canneries required non-white workers to sleep in segregated bunkhouses
and eat in segregated mess halls,"5 and that these facilities were vastly
inferior to the sleeping quarters and food service provided to white em-
ployees.86 The workers brought both disparate-treatment and disparate-
impact causes of action against the canneries, claiming that the canner-
ies' employment practices intentionally treated non-white workers in a
disparate manner, and, where the discrimination was unintentional, had
a disparate impact upon non-white workers. 7
B. Procedural Background
The federal trial court rejected the workers' disparate-treatment
claims, holding that they had failed to prove discriminatory intent.88
The district court also rejected the workers' disparate-impact challenges
for both objective and subjective employment practices.89 The district
court ruled that the workers had failed to prove that the canneries' objec-
tive employment practices had a discriminatory effect on non-whites. 90
The district court also rejected the workers' claim that the canneries' use
of subjective standards to judge job qualifications had a disparate impact
on minority aliplicants,9" adopting the view that subjective employment
practices could not be attacked under a disparate-impact theory.
92
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision;
93
84. Id. at 2120.
85. Due to the remote location of the canneries, employees are expected to live at the work
location throughout the canning season. Id. at 2119. Canning companies transport employees
to the canneries and provide them with sleeping quarters and meals. Id.
86. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (1987) (en
bane), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). Plaintiffs bolstered this claim by producing written com-
pany records which referred to various employee facilities as the "Philippine Bunkhouse,"
"Native Galley Cook" and "Filipino Mess." Id. at 2-3. Plaintiffs also produced written evi-
dence of an office mail slot labelled the "Oriental bunkhouse," and that company badge num-
bers were assigned along racial lines for ease of identification. Id. at 3. Even the salmon
butchering machine reflected racial stratification by its nickname, the "Iron Chink." Id.
87. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2120.
88. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2115, 2120 (1989).
89. Id. (citing district court).
90. Id. (citing district court). The workers' disparate-impact claim challenged both sub-
jective and objective employment practices. Id. The objective employment practices included
an English language requirement, nepotism in hiring, failure to publicly post non-cannery job
openings so that cannery employees could apply for those jobs, and a rehire preference. Id.
91. Id. (citing district court).
92. Id. (citing district court).
93. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 787 F.2d
462 (1987).
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however, in a later en bane decision,9a the circuit court held that subjec-
tive hiring practices could form the basis of a disparate-impact claim,
thereby overruling the trial court's decision.95 The Ninth Circuit also
concluded that once a plaintiff met the prima facie burden under a dispa-
rate-impact theory of liability, the burden of proof shifted to the em-
ployer to prove that the challenged employment practices were
motivated by a legitimate business necessity. 96 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper application of
Title VII's disparate-impact theory of liability.97
C. Reasoning of the Court
1. The majority opinion
In an opinion written by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, the majority in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio95 affirmed that subjective employment
practices may be challenged under a Title VII disparate-impact analy-
sis.99 Even so, the workers still had to prove the existence of a
disparity. io
a. statistical data
The Wards Cove majority stated that the workers may offer statisti-
cal proof to show the existence of a disparity within the employer's work-
place, but held that statistics showing a high percentage of non-white
workers in cannery jobs and a low percentage of non-white workers in
non-cannery jobs, without more, failed to prove that the canneries' em-
ployment practices had a disparate-impact on non-white workers. 01 Ac-
cording to the Court, the proper statistical analysis compares the racial
composition of the non-cannery jobs and the racial composition of quali-
fied candidates in the relevant labor market. 2
94. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
95. Id. at 1485. The following year, the United States Supreme Court held that subjective
employment decisions could form the basis of a disparate-impact claim. Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
96. Wards Cove, 810 F.2d at 1485-86.
97. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121 (1989).
98. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
99. Id. at 2120 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988),
where majority of Court agreed subjective employment decisions could form basis of Title VII
disparate-impact claim, even though Court was evenly divided on all other issues).
100. Id. at 2121.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)).
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The Court reasoned that the cannery work force did not reflect the
relevant pool of qualified applicants for either skilled or unskilled non-
cannery jobs. 103 Instead, the Court speculated that the low percentage of
non-whites in non-cannery jobs could simply be the result of a "dearth of
qualified nonwhite applicants for reasons that are not petitioners'
fault." 1" If so, the Court stated that the canneries' employment prac-
tices did not have a disparate impact on non-whites.105 To hold other-
wise, reasoned the Court, would mean that any employer with an
unbalanced work force could be haled into court and "forced to engage
in the expensive and time-consuming task of defending the 'business ne-
cessity' of the methods used to select [its work force]." 106
The Court further warned that such a decision might also force em-
ployers to adopt racial quotas to insure racial uniformity, a practice
which Congress expressly rejected in the drafting of Title VII.107 As long
as no barriers existed to deter qualified non-whites from applying for
non-cannery positions, and the percentage of non-whites hired into non-
cannery jobs was not significantly less than the percentage of qualified
non-whites in the relevant labor market, the majority held that the can-
neries' selection process "probably [did] not operate with a disparate-
impact on minorities."108
The majority held that the workers' use of statistical data using
presently employed Alaskan cannery workers as the relevant labor force
for non-cannery jobs was both too narrow and too broad.109 The Court
held these statistics to be too narrow because a vast number of persons
103. Id. at 2122. To bolster its holding, the majority cited jobs such as accountants, manag-
ers, boat captains, electricians, doctors and engineers as examples of the "skilled" non-cannery
jobs in the cannery communities. Id. The Court failed to include in its analysis the other non-
cannery jobs such as store clerks, cooks, mess hall staff, and cannery supervisors, which were
also filled by predominately white workers. See id. at 2119 n.3.
104. Id. at 2122 (footnote omitted).
105. Id. In a footnote, the Court admitted that the analysis would be different if the
"dearth" of qualified non-white applicants were due to employment practices which deterred
non-white workers from applying for the positions. Id. at 2122 n.7.
106. Id at 2122.
107. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391.
108. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2123. In a footnote, the Court recognized that "bottom-line
racial balance is not a defense under Title VII." Id. at 2123 n.8. Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that even if an employer could show that the percentage of qualified non-whites hired is
not significantly less than the percentage of qualified non-whites who applied, a plaintiff could
still make out a prima facie showing of racial discrimination under a Title VII disparate-im-
pact theory if the plaintiffs could prove that a particular hiring practice had a disparate impact
on members of a Title VII protected category. Id. (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
450 (1982)).
109. Id. at 2123.
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qualified for non-cannery jobs were not employed by Alaskan salmon
canneries. 110 The Court held that the data was also too broad because
the plaintiffs had made no showing that a significant number of presently
employed cannery workers would have applied for the non-cannery jobs
had the challenged employment practices not existed. 11'
The Court noted that the Wards Cove facts themselves served as a
good example of why a statistical comparison between the percentage of
non-white cannery workers versus non-white non-cannery workers was
not an adequate way in which to make out a prima facie case of dispa-
rate-impact discrimination." 2 The workers claimed one reason non-
whites were overrepresented in cannery positions was that the canneries'
main recruiting source was a local union comprised predominantly of
Filipino members." 3 If the canneries ceased to use this union, presuma-
bly the racial disparity between cannery and non-cannery jobs might de-
crease to a statistically insignificant level.114 As such, the canneries
could defeat the workers' prima facie showing by merely seeking another
recruiting source for cannery positions without changing its employment
practices. 115
The Court ultimately ruled that the workers had failed to meet their
prima facie burden through their use of deficient statistical data, but the
Court left unresolved the question of whether the record made in the trial
court could support a prima facie case of employment discrimination on
any other basis." 6 Consequently, the Court remanded the case to resolve
this question.
117
b. causation
Although the Supreme Court held that the workers in Wards Cove
had failed to meet their prima facie burden,"' the Court went beyond
what was necessary to decide the case in order to set the standard by
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The Supreme Court identified the Union as Local 37. Id. The Ninth Circuit went
into more detail and identified the Union as the International Longshoremen's and Ware-
housemen's Union. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1479 (9th Cir. 1987)
(en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). The Ninth Circuit also noted that the Union's mem-
bership is primarily Filipino. Id
114. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2123.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2123-24.
117. Id. at 2124.
118. Id.
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which lower courts must evaluate disparate-impact claims.119 According
to the majority, to meet their prima facie burden, disparate-impact plain-
tiffs must: (1) statistically prove a disparate-impact upon members of a
protected category;"' 0 and, (2) identify the specific employment practices
responsible for the alleged disparity. 121 Without this test, the Court
warned, "employers [could] potentially [be] liable for 'the myriad of in-
nocent [biases] that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition
of their work forces.' ,122
The Court justified this onerous burden of proof by noting that,
under its own precedent, employers cannot avoid Title VII liability by
statistically showing that "at the bottom line" their work force is racially
balanced. 123 By the same token, plaintiffs cannot establish Title VII lia-
bility by merely showing that, "at the bottom line," an employer's work
force is racially imbalanced. 124 Thus, statistics alone will not suffice to
prove a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination, no matter
how probative. 12 Disparate-impact plaintiffs must also prove that each
challenged employment practice has had a significantly disparate impact
on employment opportunities.
126
Applying this causation requirement to Wards Cove, the majority
ruled that statistical proof that fewer minorities were employed in non-
cannery jobs than were present in the relevant labor market would only
half-way meet the workers' prima facie burden.127 To fully meet their
burden, the workers must also identify the specific employment practices
responsible for the alleged discrimination, and prove that each practice
caused its own significant disparate impact. 2 Proof that several em-
ployment practices collectively caused a disparate impact would not meet
119. Id.
120. Id According to the Court, the proper comparison is between the racial composition
of the employer's work force and that of the relevant job market. Id. at 2121. See also supra
notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
121. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S.
Ct. 2777, 2788 (1988)).
122. Id at 2125 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2787
(1988)).
123. Id. at 2124 (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450 (1982), which held that even
though, statistically, employer's work force is racially balanced, if employer's practices have
disparate impact on individual employees, this "bottom line" equality is no defense to Title VII
liability).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2125.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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this burden."2 9 For example, the workers could not merely allege that
nepotism, segregated eating facilities, and word-of-mouth hiring prac-
tices had collectively caused a disparate impact. Instead, the workers
must prove that each challenged practice caused a significant disparate
impact in its own right. 130 The Court'failed to define what it meant by
"significant." 131
Anticipating complaints that this additional causation requirement
would unduly burden Title VII plaintiffs, the majority rationalized its
holding by stating that liberal civil discovery rules give plaintiffs broad
access to an employer's records. 132 The Court believed that these "tools"
would ameliorate any added burden the workers might experience as a
result of the Court's holding.
133
c. shifting the burden of persuasion
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate-impact
discrimination, the Wards Cove majority held that a defendant may rebut
the plaintiff's prima facie case by producing evidence of a legitimate busi-
ness interest justifying the use of the challenged conduct.13 4 The Court
referred to the defendant's rebuttal evidence as the "business justifica-
tion" phase of a disparate-impact case.135 If the defendant successfully
rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case, the Court held that the defendant
may still be found liable if alternate business practices with a less dis-
criminatory impact could be used to achieve the same business goals. 136
The Court referred to this as the "alternate practices" phase of a dispa-
rate-impact case.
137
129. Id. at 2124 n.9.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2125. Specifically, the Court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (Supp. 1989) as a rule
which would aid plaintiffs' attempts to meet their prima facie burden. This regulation man-
dates that employers must "maintain ... records or other information which will disclose the
impact which its tests and other selection procedures have upon employment opportunities of
persons by identifiable race, sex or ethnic group[s]." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(a) (Supp. 1989).
Under this regulation, employers must include records concerning "the individual components
of the selection process" where significant disparities exist between whites and non-whites for a
particular job. Id. § 1607.4(c).
133. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). See also New
York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
136. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975)).
137. Id. (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
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i. business justification
The Wards Cove majority held that the dispositive issue at the busi-
ness justification stage of a disparate-impact case is whether a challenged
employment practice significantly serves the "legitimate" employment
goals of the employer. 138 The Court held that the "touchstone" of this
inquiry is "a reasoned review" of the employer's business justification, 139
but cautioned that the business interest justifying the defendant's con-
duct need not be "essential" or "indispensable" to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case. 4°
In a break with Supreme Court precedent, the Wards Cove majority
held that a defendant can rebut a disparate-impact plaintiff's prima facie
case by simply producing evidence of a business justification, while the
plaintiff retained the ultimate burden of persuasion "at all times"
throughout the case.'4 1 Therefore, to rebut a plaintiff's case, the defend-
ant need only produce some form of evidence indicating that the defend-
ant's actions were motivated by a business interest, while the plaintiff
retains the burden of proving that the defendant's asserted business inter-
est does not justify the discriminatory conduct.42
The Court justified this holding by stating that it conformed to the
rule in disparate-treatment cases, 43 ignoring the different purposes
served by disparate-impact and disparate-treatment cases. 44 The Court
acknowledged that its ruling might "appear" to conflict with earlier
Supreme Court decisions which held that the burden of proof, not merely
the burden of production, shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant in
disparate-impact cases.145 In response to this apparent conflict, the
Court explained that "to the extent that those cases speak of an employ-
138. Id. at 2125-26 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2787
(1988); New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
139. Id. at 2126.
140. Id.
141. Id. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court stated that to rebut a prima facie
showing of disparate impact, the employer had to do more than just articulate a business
reason. 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Rather, the employer had to prove the job relatedness or
business necessity of the challenged employment practice. Id. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
142. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
143. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-58
(1981)). See also supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
144. Disparate-treatment claims provide a remedy for intentional acts of employment dis-
crimination, while disparate-impact cases provide a remedy for acts which are facially non-
discriminatory, but which have a discriminatory impact on women or on racial and religious
minorities. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
145. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
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ers' 'burden of proof' with respect to a legitimate business justification
defense... they should have been understood to mean an employer's
production-but not persuasion-burden." 46
ii. alternative employment practices
If the defendant successfully rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case by
producing evidence of a legitimate business justification, Wards Cove es-
tablished that the plaintiff may still prevail by proposing another, less
discriminatory employment practice which would equally serve the de-
fendant's business goals.147 The majority held that such a showing by
the plaintiff would prove that the defendant's chosen employment prac-
tices were merely a pretext for discrimination."a
The majority, however, qualified this ruling by stating that any al-
ternative employment practice offered by the plaintiff had to be equally
effective in meeting the defendant's employment goals, and that factors
such as cost were relevant to this determination.149 Cautioning that
"courts are generally less competent than employers to restructure busi-
ness practices,"1' 0 the majority warned that the judiciary should "pro-
ceed with care" before requiring that an employer adopt an employment
practice suggested by Title VII plaintiffs. 51
2. The dissent
In a scathing dissent written by Justice Stevens and joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun," 2 the minority accused the ma-
jority of ignoring eighteen years of precedent, turning a blind eye to the
meaning and purpose of Title VII, and indulging in judicial activism.53
a. altering the burdens of proof
The dissent disagreed that the burden of proof in a disparate-impact
case remains at all times with the plaintiff54 While acknowledging that
prior Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions had long recog-
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. Id. See also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2781 (1988);
Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425.
148. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975)).
149. Id. at 2127.
150. Id. (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)).
151. Id.
152. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2130 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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nized that an employer's burden in a disparate-treatment case is simply
one of producing evidence of a legitimate business purpose, 155 the dissent
stressed that these same courts have repeatedly held that an employer's
burden in a disparate-impact case is to prove a business necessity.1 16
The dissent explained that, when viewed from a plaintiff's initial
burden of proof, it is easy to see why disparate-treatment and disparate-
impact cases require different levels of evidence to rebut a plaintiff's
prima facie case.'57 Under a disparate-treatment analysis there is no Ti-
tle VII violation unless a plaintiff can prove an intentional act of discrim-
ination."' Thus, the dissent observed, the plaintiff always retains the
burden of proving discriminatory intent.15 9 The dissent further ex-
plained that unlike disparate-treatment claims, intent is irrelevant to a
disparate-impact case.160 Instead, the focus is on whether an employ-
ment practice "has a significant, adverse effect on an identifiable class of
workers-regardless of the cause or motive for the practice."1 61 Once a
plaintiff has met the prima facie burden in a disparate-impact case the
plaintiff has established the violation. The defendant must then justify
the challenged employment practice by proving that the chosen practice
was motivated by a legitimate business necessity.1 62 The dissent labelled
this type of rebuttal evidence as "a classic example of an affirmative de-
fense" which has always been considered a burden of proof.1 63
155. Id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Id at 2130 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To support its statement that both the
United States Supreme Court and other federal courts have long recognized that an employer's
rebuttal burden under a disparate-impact case is a burden of proof, the dissent cited New York
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (employer "rebutted" prima facie case
by "demonstration that the narcotics rule. . . 'is job related' "); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (employer must "prov[e] that the challenged requirements are job re-
lated"); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (employer has "burden of
proving that its tests are 'job related' "); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
n.14 (1973) ("employer must ... demonstrate that 'any given requirement [has] a manifest
relationship to the employment in question' "); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
432 (1971) (employer has "burden of showing that any given requirement must have a mani-
fest relationship to the employment"). Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2130 n.14 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
157. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id. & n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c) which states "in plead-
ing to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... any.., matter constituting
an avoidance or affirmative defense). Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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b. plaintiffs prima facie burden of proof
The dissent also found troubling what it called the majority's "ap-
parent redefinition" of what a plaintiff must prove to make out a prima
facie case of disparate-impact discrimination."' Recognizing as "ele-
mentary" that plaintiffs must establish a causal link between the dispa-
rate impact and the challenged employment practices, the dissent stated
that the challenged employment practices need not constitute the "sole"
or "primary" cause of the plaintiff's harm.1 65 Based on this, the dissent
argued that numerous "questionable" employment practices should be
viewed collectively to fortify a charge of employment discrimination.' 66
The dissent further noted that liberal discovery rules which permit access
to employment records will not lessen the difficulty the majority's added
causation requirement will present to the Wards Cove workers, as the
canneries did not preserve such employment records.67
c. statistical data
The dissent agreed with the majority's general premise that statisti-
cal evidence of discrimination should compare the racial composition of
the "qualified ... population in the relevant labor market" to the racial
composition of the disputed jobs.168 However, the dissent noted that this
test failed to define what is meant by the "qualified population" or the
"relevant labor market." '69 To make these terms meaningful, the dissent
argued that the definition must account for the unique factual circum-
stances of each disparate-impact case.170 The dissent cautioned that
when using statistical evidence, a court "should not strive for numerical
exactitude at the expense of the needs of the particular case." 171
According to the dissent, the Alaskan salmon industry is a unique
business with special circumstances.1 72 The work is seasonal, and the
164. Id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 2132-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct.
1775 (1989)).
166. Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2133 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)).
169. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a short dissent concurring with the dissent
written by Justice Stevens, Justice Blackmun interpreted the majority's holding as "bar[ring]
the use of internal workforce comparisons in the making of a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, even where the structure of the industry in question renders any other statistical compari-
son meaningless." Id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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canneries are located in remote, sparsely populated areas. 173  Even
though the skills required for the non-cannery jobs varied greatly, 174 the
dissent predicted that many workers from the so-called "relevant geo-
graphic area" qualified for these jobs might not be willing to accept a job
under these special circumstances.1 75 The dissent reasoned that these
special circumstances justified using existing Alaskan cannery workers to
define the relevant labor market for non-cannery jobs. 176
Although the district court defined the relevant labor market for
cannery jobs as the general population of "Alaska, the Pacific Northwest,
and California," 177 the dissent called this characterization of the relevant
labor market "not adequately founded." 178 The dissent reasoned that a
fair characterization of the relevant labor market could not be based
upon the general population in Alaska, the Pacific Northwest, and Cali-
fornia because such figures do not identify the portion of the general pop-
ulation willing to accept employment under these unique
circumstances.1 79 Instead, the dissent insisted that the relevant market
had to be narrowed to only those workers willing to perform seasonal
work in a remote area of Alaska.180
Defining the relevant labor market as those individuals already em-
ployed by the Alaskan cannery industry narrowed the statistical data to
workers willing to accept employment under these unique circum-
stances. 81 For this reason, the dissent concluded that statistics compar-
ing the racial composition of cannery jobs to non-cannery jobs
represented the more probative comparison,18 2 and that the workers
should have been allowed to use these statistics to establish their prima
facie case.1
8 3
173. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 2133-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The skills required ranged from "good health"
and a "drivers license," to the ability to operate a seam micrometer. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
175. Id. at 2134 (Stevens, 3., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2134-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that some of the cannery
workers who had been denied non-cannery jobs because they were considered "unskilled" later
became architects, an Air Force officer and a graduate student in public administration. Id. at
2134 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent thought it significant that some of the cannery
workers had college degrees at the time they were employed by the canneries and considered
unqualified for unskilled non-cannery jobs. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2133-34 & n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2134-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (Stevens, 3., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 184 case involved an extreme
set of facts"'5 and only challenged the employer's subjective employment
decisions.1 6 For these reasons, it is possible that the Court intended the
Wards Cove decision to be confined to its facts, or to apply only in dispa-
rate-impact cases challenging subjective employment decisions. If the
Court intended that its holdings apply to all disparate-impact claims" 7 it
is simply impossible to reconcile these rulings with prior Supreme Court
case law. Even if the decision is confined to cases challenging subjective
employment decisions, it contravenes congressional intent and repre-
sents, in the words of the dissent, a "sojourn into judicial activism." '
The majority made three significant rulings. First, the Court held
that statistical disparities alone will not suffice to establish a prima facie
case of a disparate-impact discrimination.8 9 In addition to statistical
proof of a disparity, the plaintiff must identify the specific employment
practices responsible for the alleged disparity and demonstrate that each
practice caused a significant disparate impact.19 A collection of ques-
tionable employment practices alleged to have collectively caused a sig-
nificant disparate impact does not meet this burden. 191
Second, the Court held that once a plaintiff meets the prima facie
burden, the defendant may rebut the plaintiff's case by producing evi-
dence of a legitimate business interest justifying the defendant's con-
duct. 92 The Court held that the defendant's rebuttal burden is merely
one of producing evidence, while the plaintiff retains the burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that the defendant's business interest is insub-
stantial.1 93 The Court further held that the employer's business interest
need not be "essential" or "indispensable" to rebut the plaintiff's prima
184. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
185. IM at 2119-20.
186. Id. at 2120-21.
187. Id. at 2121 (Court states that it is addressing proper application of Title VII's dispa-
rate-impact theory of liability).
188. Id at 2128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id at 2125.
190. Id. Justice Blackmun characterized this as "requir[ing] practice-by-practice statistical
proof of causation, even where, as here, such proof would be impossible." Id. at 2136 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2124 n.9 (majority notes one flaw in court of appeals decision was that "the
specific employment practices were challenged only insofar as they were claimed to have been
responsible for overall disparity between number of minority cannery and noncannery work-
ers. The Court of Appeals did not purport to hold that any specified employment practice
produced its own disparate impact that was actionable under Title VII.").
192. Id. at 2125.
193. Id. at 2126.
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facie case. 194
Third, the Court held that if a disparate-impact defendant success-
fully rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff may still prevail
by proposing alternative employment practices which would serve the
employer's business interests equally well. 195 The Court warned that any
alternative practices offered by the plaintiff must be equally effective in
meeting the employer's business goals and that cost or other burdens to
the employer are relevant considerations in this determination. 196 Each
of these decisions, and the analytical errors committed by the Court in
arriving at them are examined in the following sections.
A. Supreme Court Recognition of Disparate-Impact Claims
The history of Title VII disparate-impact litigation is replete with
Supreme Court decisions recognizing that Congress intended plaintiffs to
have two methods by which to prove a Title VII violation: disparate
treatment and disparate impact.97 Because Title VII is concerned with
the consequences of employment discrimination, past Supreme Court de-
cisions have required employers to choose employment practices that
neither overly discriminate, nor "operate as 'built-in headwinds'" to mi-
nority employees. 198 The majority opinion in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio199 disregards Supreme Court precedence and so severely toughens
a disparate-impact plaintiff's burdens of proof, that it is doubtful
whether this cause of action survives the Wards Cove decision.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2°° the United States Supreme Court
recognized that Congress enacted Title VII as a way to remove all "artifi-
cial, arbitrary, and unnecessary" employment barriers which invidiously
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2127.
197. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). See also Johnson v. Trans-
portation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Washington
v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
198. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
199. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
200. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, black employees at a generating plant sued their em-
ployer under Title VII, alleging that by requiring a high school diploma and a minimum score
on an intelligence test as a condition of employment in non-labor job categories, the employer
had caused a discriminatory effect on non-white applicants. Id. at 427. The United States
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that Title VII not only proscribes overt
discrimination, but also proscribes employment practices which are "fair in form but discrimi-
natory in operation." Id. at 431.
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discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or national origin.2 °1
The Griggs Court in 1971 held that "good intent" or the "absence of
discriminatory intent" is not a defense to employment practices with a
discriminatory effect.2"2 The Court stated that "[C]ongress directed the
thrust of Title VII to the consequences of employment practices, not sim-
ply the motivation."20 3 Based on that policy, the Court allowed the
plaintiffs to prove a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination by dem-
onstrating the disparate consequences of the defendant's employment
practices, without proving a discriminatory intent by the employer. 2°4
Eleven years after the Griggs decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
in Connecticut v. Teal2 "5 that Title VII prohibits both intentional dis-
crimination and employment practices which are not intentionally dis-
criminatory but which have discriminatory consequences.20 6 In Teal, the
Court augmented its earlier Title VII holdings by adding that the lan-
guage of Title VII not only forbids discrimination which has a disparate
impact against groups of employees protected by Title VII, but also for-
bids employment practices which "deprive[] any individual of employ-
ment opportunities."207 According to the Court, Congress did not intend
to give employers the ability to discriminate against individual employ-
ees, as long as the employer treated members of a protected category
favorably as a whole.20 Therefore, to comply with Title VII after the
Teal decision, employers had to not only choose employment practices
which did not have a discriminatory impact on protected groups of em-
ployees as a whole, as was proscribed by Griggs, but employers also had
to choose employment practices which did not deprive individual em-
ployees within the protected class of "employment opportunities."20 9
201. Id.
202. Id. at 432.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
206. Id In Teal, four black women employed by the Department of Income Maintenance
of the State of Connecticut sued the Department under a Title VII disparate-impact theory
alleging that the Department's requirement that employees pass a written test as an absolute
condition for promotions disproportionately excluded blacks. Id. at 444. One month before
trial, the Department instituted what the court of appeals called an affirmative action program
to ensure that a significant number of minorities were represented in the Department's various
job classifications. Id As a result of this action, 22.9% of those promoted were black and
13.5% of those promoted were white, which created a "bottom line" result more favorable to
blacks than to whites. Id Defendants argued that this favorable "bottom line" was an abso-
lute defense to plaintiffs' claims. Id.
207. Id. at 453 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982)) (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 455.
209. Id. at 456.
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The Griggs and Teal decisions made clear that all forms of employ-
ment discrimination, whether intentional or not, fell within the purview
of Title VII. Together, the two cases created a broad range of disparate-
impact claims, allowing plaintiffs to challenge employment practices that
either had a disparate-impact against groups of employees protected by
Title VII, or against individual members of those groups. After Wards
Cove, it seems clear that a majority of the Court no longer holds this
view.
B. Additional Prima Facie Burden
The Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio2 ° majority held that a dispa-
rate-impact plaintiff's prima facie burden goes beyond the need to prove
a statistical disparity.211 The plaintiff must also identify the specific em-
ployment practices responsible for the disparate impact, and prove that
each challenged practice has caused its own significant disparity.212 The
Court called this the causation requirement.213 This additional prima
facie burden ignores the congressional intent behind Title VII and con-
tradicts prior Supreme Court case law.
Disparate-impact claims aid Congress in its struggle to eradicate the
consequences of employment discrimination. 214 Guided by this congres-
sional intent, 1 5 the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that gross
statistical disparities, without more, may constitute a prima facie case of
Title VII discrimination.21 6 Where the plaintiff is unable to prove a gross
210. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
211. Id at 2124 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2788
(1988)).
212. Id. at 2124-25. The majority stated that "'plaintiff must begin by identifying the spe-
cific employment practice that is challenged.'" Id. at 2124 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2788 (1988)) (emphasis added). The majority also stated
that "[a]s a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific
or particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack." Id.
In challenging the majority's holding, the dissent stated that "[a]lthough the causal link must
have substance, the act need not constitute the sole or primary cause of the harm." Id. at 2132
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 2124.
214. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
215. The majority in Griggs stated that Congress intended Title VII to "remov[e] ... artifi-
cial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification[s]." Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 431. See also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2164 (unrelenting broad-scale action against discrimina-
tion is critical in combating employment discrimination); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 14-15 (1971) (corrective measures are urgently required for institutional discrimination).
216. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). See also generally Arlington
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statistical disparity, the Court has required that the plaintiff identify con-
duct by the employer responsible for the alleged disparity, but has held
that such conduct need not constitute the sole or primary cause of the
plaintiff's harm.217 According to the Court, the challenged conduct need
only be a contributing factor.218
The Court has also recognized that the facts in Title VII cases vary
greatly.2 19 Therefore, prima facie burdens of proof must be applied with
flexibility to accommodate these varied claims.220 Otherwise, rigidly ap-
plied rules could allow certain consequences of employment discrimina-
tion to go unchecked simply because a plaintiff failed to meet an onerous
standard.22 '
Requiring a disparate-impact plaintiff to prove a statistical disparity,
and practice-by-practice statistical causation,222 places a harsh burden on
disparate-impact plaintiffs, while "tipping the scales in favor of disparate-
impact employers. ' 221 Proving a causal link between the alleged dispar-
ity and the employer's conduct is a reasonable requirement needed to
ensure that the employer actually caused the plaintiff's injury; however,
a gross statistical disparity within an employer's work force has histori-
cally been held by the Supreme Court to adequately establish this causal
link.224
By requiring a plaintiff to prove that each challenged practice
caused its own "significant" disparate impact, the Court has foreclosed
the possibility of asserting that several questionable employment prac-
tices collectively caused a significant disparity. A disparate-impact plain-
tiff may simply be unable to prove that each challenged employment
practice individually caused a significant disparate impact, even though it
may be clear from a statistical evaluation of the employer's workforce
that gross disparities do exist. In many cases, a discriminatory impact
may be the result of numerous employment decisions tainted by discrimi-
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976).
217. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1785-86 (1989).
218. Id, at 1785.
219. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-76 (1978).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 579-80. In Furnco, the Court stated that "it is clear beyond cavil that the obliga-
tion imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of
race, without regard to whether members of the applicant's race are already proportionately
represented in the work force." Id. at 579. Based on this, the Court believed that flexibility is
needed to fight discrimination in the work place. Id. at 580.
222. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125; id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339.
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nation, but which can not be proven to have caused a significant disparity
in their own right.225 The disparate-impact cause of action was meant to
address this type of elusive discrimination by focusing on the effects of
employment discrimination, rather than the intent.2 26
The majority's ruling will allow employment discrimination to sur-
vive in cases where the plaintiff can prove a gross statistical disparity,
along with a collection of questionable employment practices, but is un-
able to prove that any one of the practices individually produced a signif-
icant disparate impact. This disserves the congressional intent that Title
VII eradicate all consequences of employment discrimination.227
Proof of a statistical disparity alone should not be sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Such a standard
would expose employers to potential liability for "'the myriad of inno-
cent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of
their work forces.' "228 Proof of a statistical disparity, plus a collection
of questionable employment practices may also be insufficient to protect
employers from unfounded litigation. But, where the plaintiff can prove
a gross statistical disparity, the Court should allow the requisite causal
link to be established by identifying a collection of questionable employ-
ment practices which collectively caused a significant disparate im-
pact.229 Extending the Wards Cove holding in this way would protect
employers from senseless litigation, while recognizing that Title VII was
meant to be applied with flexibility in order to eradicate all forms of em-
225. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2132 n.19, 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For instance,
in Wards Cove the workers alleged gross disparities within the canneries' work force, and
alleged that these disparities were caused by nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective
hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, and a practice of not promoting from within. Id. at
2120. The majority reversed the court of appeals' decision that this established prima facie
disparate-impact discrimination because the lower court had not "purport[ed] to hold that any
specified employment practice produced its own disparate impact that was actionable under
Title VII." Id. at 2124 n.9.
226. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (stating, by analogy, that Title VII "provide[s] ... [that]
the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can use" and that Title VII goes
beyond proscribing acts of "overt discrimination").
227. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 19, 24 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2164 (unrelenting, broad-scale action critical in combat-
ing discrimination); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 14-15 (1971) (corrective measures
are urgently required to combat institutional discrimination).
228. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108
S. Ct. 2777, 2787 (1988)).
229. This position is supported by the Wards Cove dissent, in which Justice Stevens states
"in a disparate-impact case, proof of numerous questionable employment practices ought to
fortify an employee's assertion that the practices caused racial disparities." Id. at 2132-33
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ployment discrimination.23
C. Altered Burdens of Proof
According to the Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 31 majority, to
rebut a plaintiff's prima facie disparate-impact case, the defendant must
assert a legitimate business interest justifying the challenged employment
practice.232 The Court acknowledged that the "touchstone" of this in-
quiry is a "reasoned review" of the defendant's business justification,
33
but shattered its own case law by holding that the burden of persuasion
in this analysis remains at all times with the plaintiff.2 34 After Wards
Cove, the defendant need only produce evidence of a business justifica-
tion,2 35 while the plaintiff must persuade the trier of fact that the justifi-
cation is not significant.236
The Court explained that requiring the plaintiff to retain the burden
of proof conforms with the rule in disparate-treatment cases.237 This jus-
tification ignores the fact that the Supreme Court has always considered
disparate-impact and disparate-treatment cases to be different theories of
Title VII liability, with different sets of rules.238 Rather than overrule
prior case law, the Court chose to simply redefine a few key terms by
curtly stating that where prior cases spoke of a defendant's burden of
persuasion, this language really meant "an employer's production-but
not persuasion-burden., 239  This is simply not true. As far back as
1973, the Supreme Court recognized that, in disparate-impact cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving their prima facie case, and defend-
ants must prove a business justification to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie
230. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 575-76.
231. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
232. Id. at 2125-26.
233. Id. at 2126; New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
234. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126. This was first held by a plurality of the Court in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988). The decision to shift
the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff in a disparate-impact case sharply divided the Court in
Watson. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice White and Justice Scalia held
that the ultimate burden of proving that Title VII employment discrimination had occurred
against a protected group of workers remained at all times with the plaintiff. Id. Watson's
plurality decision has become the majority opinion in Wards Cove. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct.
at 2126.
235. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424; see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
239. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
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evidence. 2" For the past sixteen years, this standard has been applied to
disparate-impact cases.24
Disparate-impact and disparate-treatment claims are based on dis-
tinct theories intended to serve separate functions; therefore, claims
based on these distinct theories should not be made to conform to the
same rules. Unlike a disparate-impact claim, disparate-treatment cases
require that the plaintiff prove the defendant acted with discriminatory
intent.242 Without evidence of discriminatory intent, no Title VII viola-
tion has occurred.243 Because of this, it makes sense that a disparate-
treatment plaintiff retain the burden of persuasion on the issue of intent
at all times throughout the case.2 " Unlike disparate-treatment claims,
intent is not an element of a disparate-impact case;245 therefore, no such
justification exists for applying the disparate-treatment standards to these
cases.
24 6
In addition to altering the burdens of proof, the majority also
changed the standard by which the defendant's rebuttal evidence will be
evaluated. In the past, disparate-impact plaintiffs have had to show that
the challenged practice "manifestly" served a legitimate employment
goal.247 Black's Law Dictionary defines manifest as "unmistakable" and
"indisputable," 248 setting a high standard for a defendant's rebuttal evi-
dence. In disparate-treatment cases, the Court has held that as long as
an employer's business practices are "reasonably related to the achieve-
ment of some legitimate [business] goal," the defendant has met its rebut-
240. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973) (plaintiff must first
prove prima facie case; burden then shifts to employer to articulate business justification which
is "shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs"); see also
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) ("employer must.., demonstrate" that rebuttal
evidence has a strong relationship to challenged employment practice); New York Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979) (employer successfully rebutted plaintiff's
prima facie case by "demonstrating" that employment practice was job-related); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (employer must "prove" that the challenged job require-
ments are job-related); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (employer
has "burden of proving" that employment practices are job-related); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432
(employer has burden of "showing" that screening test is job-related).
241. See, eg., Bunch v. Bullard, 795 F.2d 384, 393-94 (5th Cir. 1986); Lewis v. Bloomsburg
Mills, 773 F.2d 561, 572 & n.18 (4th Cir. 1985); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, 697 F.2d 810,
815 (8th Cir. 1983).
242. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. See also supra notes 41-47 and accompanying
text.
243. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. See also supra notes 48-58.
246. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; see also Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425.
248. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 495 (5th ed. 1983).
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tal burden.249 The Wards Cove majority offered a third standard by
which to evaluate a defendant's rebuttal evidence. According to the
Court, the dispositive issue at the justification stage of a disparate-impact
case is whether the challenged employment practices serve "in a signifi-
cant way" the employer's legitimate business goals.25
After Wards Cove, the rules governing the justification stage of dis-
parate-impact and disparate-treatment cases now conform.251 It is un-
clear if the Court simply meant that the ultimate burdens of proof now
conform, or if the standard governing the defendant's rebuttal evidence
in a disparate-treatment case should also be applied to disparate-impact
claims. The standard used in disparate-treatment claims requires that
the challenged employment practices be reasonably related to a legiti-
mate business goal.252 This standard suspiciously resembles the highly
deferential "rational basis" test used in other constitutional contexts.253
Normally, constitutional claims involving racial discrimination invoke
the Court's "strictest scrutiny." '254 Although not all Title VII claims in-
volve racial discrimination, many do. After Wards Cove, courts may be
allowed to evaluate an employer's rebuttal evidence for both disparate-
treatment and disparate-impact claims under a standard resembling the
"rational basis" test, including those Title VII claims challenging racial
discrimination. 25 At least in the past this standard was confined to dis-
parate-treatment claims.
By stating that the business justification stage of disparate-impact
249. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978). In Furnco, the
Court stated that the employer need only "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the employer's [conduct]." Id at 578.
250. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
251. Id. at 2126.
252. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577-78.
253. Traditionally applied, the "rational basis" test allows courts to defer to Congress or
state legislatures when evaluating certain laws. If the court defers to the legislature, it still
must determine whether the law serves a legitimate interest. See, e.g., United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (deference to Congress on equal protection chal-
lenge to social and economic legislation where classification system has some "reasonable
basis"); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (deference to municipal-
ity's judgment in managing traffic problems where ordinance claimed to violate due process).
254. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 n.5 (1982); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
255. Under this form of cursory judicial scrutiny, courts may merely determine whether the
defendant's business justification is legitimate, and defer to the employer's assessment as to
whether the challenged employment practice substantially furthers this legitimate business in-
terest. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 1440 (2d ed. 1988). See
also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (legislature "could have
rationally believed" packaging regulation would further environmental objectives). Such a
standard has never before been used in cases involving racial discrimination.
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and disparate-treatment claims now conform to the same rules, the Court
may have simply meant that these claims now conform to the same bur-
dens of persuasion, while maintaining separate standards for evaluating
the defendant's rebuttal evidence.2" 6 Although the Court cites Griggs v.
Duke Power 257 as authority for its articulation of the proper standard,25
the Court weakens the Griggs standard in the defendant's favor by hold-
ing that the defendant's challenged conduct need not be "essential" or
"indispensable" to pass constitutional muster.25 9 This suggests that the
Court may have wished to establish a new standard which will fall some-
where between the "manifest relationship" test of prior disparate-impact
cases, and the "rationally related" test used in cases involving a dispa-
rate-treatment analysis. It remains to be seen which standard the Court
will apply.
D. Alternative Business Practices
In addition to increasing the causation requirements and reallocat-
ing the burdens of proof, the Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio2 1° major-
ity dealt one final blow to the disparate-impact cause of action. The
majority affirmed its own case law by holding that if a disparate-impact
plaintiff is unable to persuade the finder of fact on the question of the
defendant's business justification, the plaintiff may still prevail if able to
propose alternative business practices which would reduce the discrimi-
natory impact of the defendant's conduct.261 The Court augmented this
standard by stating that factors such as "cost" or "other burdens" are
relevant to this determination. 262 The Court further held that the pro-
posed practices must serve the employer's interest equally well, and that
courts are less competent than employers to "restructure" business prac-
tices263 and should proceed with care before requiring an employer to
adopt a plaintiff's proposed alternative.2 4
Requiring that the plaintiff's proposed employment practices serve
the employer's business goals "equally" well, and cautioning courts to
"proceed with care" before adopting a plaintiff's proposed alternatives
256. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
257. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
258. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126. Griggs states that the defendant's employment prac-
tice must bear a "manifest" relationship to legitimate business goals. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
259. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
260. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
261. Id. at 2126.
262. Id. at 2127.
263. Id. (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)).
264. Id.
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toughens the standard previously applied by the Supreme Court. In the
past, the Supreme Court has held that once a disparate-impact defendant
rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case, "it remains open to the com-
plaining party to show that other [employment practices] without a simi-
larly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate
interest. '265 Such a showing was deemed sufficient to prove that the de-
fendant's chosen employment practices were a mere pretext for
discrimination.266
The goal of Title VII is to prevent employment discrimination.267
While condoning unsubstantiated claims of employment discrimination
would undermine this goal, it also disserves this goal to make it virtually
impossible for a plaintiff to prevail unless able to affirmatively prove an
overt act of intentional discrimination. If "cost" or "other burdens" are
relevant in determining whether a proposed practice equally serves the
employer's interests,268 coupled with a strong statement that courts
should proceed with care before mandating the adoption of an alternative
employment practice,269 disparate-impact plaintiffs have little chance of
ever successfully offering an alternative practice which will be adopted by
the court.
E. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio and Comparable Worth
The Wards Cove decision will severely limit all Title VII disparate-
impact claims, but its effect will be particularly harsh on disparate-im-
pact claims based upon the doctrine of comparable worth. Without the
doctrine of comparable worth, victims of wage discrimination will be de-
prived of a viable way to challenge pay disparities among jobs which are
not equal, but merely comparable.270 In recent years, comparable worth
seemed to be gaining acceptance as a legal doctrine.271 Unfortunately,
the Wards Cove decision will impede this acceptance by rendering it vir-
tually impossible to prove a prima facie case of Title VII wage discrimi-
nation based on the theory of comparable worth.
The legal basis for a comparable-worth claim is limited. Compara-
265. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
266. Id.
267. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
268. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
269. Id.
270. See WOMEN'S LE9AL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 1, at 1; Brogan, Group Seeks to
Close Pay Gap Between Sexes, The Providence J. Bull., Aug. 29, 1988, § E, at 1, col. 2; Frank-
lin, Wage Gap Still Hasn't Been Bridged, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 8, 1989, § C, at 2, col. 2.
271. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43a.01(3) (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
41.06.150-.155; 28B.16.166 (1986).
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ble-worth claims cannot be brought under the Equal Pay Act, because
the act only provides a remedy for wage discrimination among jobs that
are equivalent.2 72 Under Title VII, plaintiffs cannot base a comparable-
worth claim on a disparate-treatment cause of action because disparate-
treatment claims require proof that the defendant's conduct was moti-
vated by a discriminatory intent.273 Courts generally have reasoned that
an employer's decision to base salaries on the competitive market, rather
than on their comparable worth, is not the result of an intent to discrimi-
nate, but is merely an economic decision.274 Therefore, comparable-
worth suits must be based on a disparate-impact cause of action. By se-
verely restricting the applicability of disparate-impact claims in general,
the Wards Cove majority has virtually eliminated a plaintiff's ability to
challenge sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII.
1. Supreme Court recognition of the comparable-worth doctrine
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court held in County of Wash-
ington v. Gunther2 75 that claims of sex-based wage discrimination were
not limited to suits brought under the Equal Pay Act.2 76 Such claims
were held to also be actionable under Title VII.2 77 This ruling opened
the door to wage discrimination claims which would fail under the Equal
Pay Act's standard of equal work. Although the Gunther Court was not
272. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
273. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977). See also supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
274. See American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985) (employer's decision to base salaries on open market not evidence of
discriminatory intent, since employer did not create market disparity); Spaulding v. University
of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 700 (9th Cir.) (discriminatory intent will not be inferred from wage
differences between jobs that are merely comparable but not substantially equal), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
275. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
276. Id at 179-80. See also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982). This statute is commonly re-
ferred to as the Equal Pay Act and provides in relevant part:
No employer... shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employ-
ees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employ-
ees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the per-
formance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made
pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality or production; or (iv) a differential based on any other
factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differ-
ential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions
of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
Id. (emphasis in original).
277. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 181.
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confronted with a comparable-worth claim,278 the Court acknowledged
that the theory of comparable worth existed and did not rule out the
possibility of a Title VII comparable-worth claim.27 9
Not all members of the Gunther Court agreed that wage discrimina-
tion claims should be allowed to go beyond the standard set by the Equal
Pay Act. In a dissenting opinion, then Justice Rehnquist stated that all
278. Id. at 166. In Gunther, female prison guards filed suit under Title VII alleging that the
County of Washington intentionally paid female guards employed in the women's section of
the county jail less than male guards employed in the men's section. Id at 164. In response to
the plaintiffs' allegation, the County argued that the Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1988), incorporated into Title VII the Equal Pay Act's requirement of "substantially
equal work" for claims based upon sex-based wage discrimination. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 165.
Therefore, the County argued that in order to claim a violation of Title VII wage discrimina-
tion, the plaintiff had to prove that an employee of the opposite gender was paid a higher wage
for the same work. Id. at 168.
The Supreme Court held that the Bennett Amendment, passed the same year as Title VII,
was merely a way to rectify any possible inconsistencies between Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act. Id. at 173; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988). The
Court held that the amendment simply incorporated into Title VII the affirmative defenses
contained in the Equal Pay Act, without incorporating the Equal Pay Act's requirement that
the challenged salary disparity involve jobs requiring equal skill, equal effort, equal responsibil-
ity and that the jobs be performed under similar working conditions. Gunther, 452 U.S. at
170. In support of its decision, the Court reaffirmed that "Title VII's prohibition of discrimi-
natory employment practices was intended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing 'not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.'" Id.
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). The Court held that to restrict
a Title VII plaintiff's claim of wage discrimination to suits of unequal pay for equal work
would conflict with Congress' intent to supply a cause of action for all forms of employment
discrimination related to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment based
on sex. Id. at 170-71.
The Court concluded that to read the Bennett Amendment as requiring Title VII sex-
based wage discrimination claims to be restricted to the equal work standard of the Equal Pay
Act would mean that a woman who is discriminatorily underpaid would have no right to relief
unless her employer also employed a man in the same job, within the same company, at a
higher rate of pay. Id. at 178. If, the Court observed, an employer hired a woman into a
unique position, or if an employer used a sex-biased system for wage determination for posi-
tions not equal to those held by men, a woman might be denied the right to prove that the
employer had committed a violation of Title VII. Id. at 179. According to the Gunther major-
ity, "Congress surely did not intend ... to insulate such blatantly discriminatory practices
from judicial redress under Title VII." Id.
279. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 181. Although the Court did not openly endorse the doctrine of
comparable worth, id. at 166, the Court showed support for the doctrine in a footnote criticiz-
ing the dissent for its "attempts to minimize the siguificance of the Title VII remedy.., on the
ground that the Equal Pay Act already provides an action for sex-based wage discrimination
by women who hold jobs not currently held by men.... But the dissent's position would still
leave remediless all victims of discrimination who hold jobs never held by men." Id. at 179
n.19. (emphasis in original). The majority stated that its ruling did not "decide... the precise
contours of lawsuits challenging sex discrimination in compensation under Title VII" sug-
gesting that the Court would allow a Title VII wage discrimination claim to be based on a
theory of comparable worth. Id
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wage discrimination claims must meet the Equal Pay Act's requirement
of equal work.280  According to Justice Rehnquist, Title VII, together
with the Equal Pay Act provide a "balanced approach to resolving sex-
based wage discrimination claims."2 ' Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
Title VII guarantees female workers equal access to all jobs, and the
Equal Pay Act assures that men and women performing equal work are
paid the same wage.28 2 Justice Rehnquist admitted that his narrow read-
ing of Title VII would eliminate a remedy for situations in which women
are paid less than men for comparable work.28 3 However, he reasoned
that Title VII was only intended to protect workers from overt discrimi-
nation. 284 Although this statement contradicted prior Supreme Court
case law,28 5 it was nonetheless prophetic. Indeed, the current Court's
severe restriction on disparate-impact claims in Wards Cove implies that
a majority of the Court agrees with Chief Justice Rehnquist that Title
VII should only prohibit overt discrimination.
2. Comparable-worth claims after Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
Prior to the Wards Cove decision, disparate-impact plaintiffs could
allege a prima facie case of employment discrimination by proving that a
facially neutral employment practice fell more harshly on members of a
protected category and was not justified by a business necessity. 28 6 In the
comparable-worth context, the plaintiff had to prove membership in a
protected category; that they held a sex-segregated job; that they were
paid less than a sex-segregated job classification held by men; and that
the two job classifications involved work that was similar in skill, effort,
and responsibility.28 7
After Wards Cove, comparable-worth plaintiffs will be unable to
prove a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination. 8 8 First, to
280. Id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 200 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
282. Id (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 202 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 201 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
285. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
286. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336-37 n.15.
287. See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171; Manuel v. W.S.B.T., 706 F. Supp. 654, 658-59 (N.D.
Ind. 1988); Crockwell v. Blackmun-Mooring Steamatic, 627 F. Supp. 800, 802 (W.D. Tenn.
1985); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 437 (W.D. Wis. 1982). But see American
Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 721-22 (7th Cir. 1986); see also infra note 288.
288. Although evolving, the doctrine of comparable worth has had limited sucdess in the
lower federal courts. In the past, plaintiffs have been allowed to allege that disparities in wages
between male and female-dominated job classifications have had a disparate impact on women,
provided the plaintiff could prove the defendant's decision to set salaries according to the open
1518 [Vol. 23:1483
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establish a prima facie case, a comparable-worth plaintiff must statisti-
cally prove the existence of a wage disparity between the salaries paid to
men and those paid to women for comparable work.289 This statistical
comparison must be based on a comparison between the employer's work
market was the result of an employment policy involving the employer's independent business
judgment. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 705 (Ninth Circuit).
If the employer could prove that this salary decision was the result of reliance on the open
market, a plaintiff's comparable worth claim was usually held to be outside the scope of Title
VII. Id. See also American Fed'n, 770 F.2d at 1406 (under disparate-impact analysis, em-
ployer's decision to base wages on competitive market, rather than theory of comparable worth
did not violate Title VII since such decision "involves the assessment of a number of complex
factors not easily ascertainable, an assessment too multifaceted to be appropriate for disparate-
impact analysis"); Lemons v. Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir. 1978) ("we do not interpret
Title VII as requiring employers to ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely differ-
ent work classifications"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d
353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Title VII [does not intend] to abrogate the laws of supply and
demand or other economic principles that determine wage rates for various kinds of work.").
In addition to overcoming this "market defense," a comparable-worth plaintiff would also
need to be in a jurisdiction which allowed subjective employment decisions to form the basis of
a disparate-impact claim. The First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits allowed subjective employment decisions to form the basis of a
disparate-impact claim. See, eg., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d. 1477 (9th Cir.
1987) (challenge to hiring, promotion and rehire policies), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Griffin
v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985) (promotion practices challenged); Hawkins v.
Bounds, 752 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985) (standardless promotion system challenged); Coser v.
Moore, 739 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1984) (challenge to prior experience requirements for female
staff); Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1984) (challenge to layoff proce-
dures); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (performance review system chal-
lenged), cert. denied sub nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); Wilmore v. Wilmington,
699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983) (promotion procedure challenged).
The Fourth Circuit only allowed objective employment decisions to form the basis of a
disparate-impact claim. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d
633, 639 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarkets, 720 F.2d 326 (4th Cir.
1983) (unrestricted discretion of managers not actionable under disparate-impact theory), cert
denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
The Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits were split on this issue. See, eg., Bunch v. Bul-
lard, 795 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1986) (impact analysis applied to promotion practices); Griffin v.
Board of Regents, 795 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1986) (impact analysis not applied to system classi-
fying employees as regular or temporary employees); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d
524 (7th Cir. 1985) (impact analysis applied to disciplinary system); Vuyanich v. Republic
Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1983) (impact analysis not applied to hiring policies), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); Gilbert v. Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983) (impact
analysis applied to promotion practices), cert denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984); Harris v. Ford
Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1981) (impact analysis not applied to discharge policy).
Beginning with the decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., subjective em-
ployment decisions can form the basis of a disparate-impact claim. 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2786-87
(1988).
289. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121 (statistics generally form proper basis for initial inquiry
in disparate-impact case).
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force and the relevant labor market. 290 A comparable-worth plaintiff
will only be able to meet this prima facie burden if allowed to define the
relevant labor market as the plaintiff's own work place. If the plaintiff is
required to define the relevant labor market as including women outside
the plaintiff's own work place, the plaintiff will be unable to prove a
statistical disparity. The competitive labor market is the source of the
discrimination in a comparable-worth suit by placing a lower value on
work performed by women.2 91 Therefore, a statistical comparison be-
tween the salaries paid to women within-the defendant's work force, and
those paid to women in the same jobs in the relevant labor market will
never yield a disparity.
In adcitiorf to proving a statistical disparity, a comparable-worth
plaintiff must identify the specific employment practices responsible for
the alleged discrimination, proving that each practice caused its own sig-
nificant disparate impact. 92 Courts have generally held that the decision
to base wages on the competitive market, rather than on a system of
comparable worth, cannot be classified as a specific employment prac-
tice.293 Instead, courts have held that such a decision involves the assess-
ment of many complex, multifaceted factors such as salary surveys,
administrative recommendations, budget proposals, and profit motiva-
tions, which collectively culminate in a salary system.294 Therefore,
comparable-worth plaintiffs will be unable to identify the specific em-
ployment practices responsible for an employer's decision to implement a
salary system based on the competitive market, much less prove that any
one of those decisions caused a significant disparate impact.
The Wards Cove majority stated that liberal discovery rules which
give plaintiffs broad access to employment records will balance any un-
due burden this specific causation requirement will have on Title VII
plaintiffs.295 In the Wards Cove case itself, liberal discovery rules had
290. Id.
291. See Feldberg, Comparable Worth: Toward Theory and Practice in the United States, 10
3. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'T 313 (1984).
292. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124-25.
293. See American Fed'n, 770 F.2d at 1406 (employer's decision to base salaries on competi-
tive market instead of theory of comparable worth requires assessment of complex factors;
therefore, comparable worth not appropriate to Title VII disparate-impact analysis); Lemons,
620 F.2d at 228 (Title VII does not require employers to ignore market in setting wage rates
for different job classifications); Christensen, 563 F.2d at 353 (plaintiffs may not establish
prima facie case of Title VII discrimination on fact employees of different sexes receive differ-
ent wages for work of equal value to employer if such wages do not command higher wage in
competitive labor market).
294. See, eg., American Fed'n, 770 F.2d at 1406.
295. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
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little effect, since it was undisputed that the canneries did not preserve
employment records. 296 In the comparable worth context, liberal discov-
ery rules will likewise have little effect in helping plaintiffs establish their
prima facie case. Any records the employer may have kept will simply
show that women in certain job categories are paid less than male em-
ployees in other job categories. Such records will provide no help in es-
tablishing that the lower wages paid to women are the result of
employment discrimination.
To rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case, Wards Cove allows a defend-
ant merely to produce evidence of a business interest justifying the al-
leged discriminatory employment practice.2 97 According to the Court,
this challenged practice need not be "essential" or "indispensable" to the
defendant's business goals to pass constitutional muster.298 Further-
more, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's business justification
is insignificant.2 99 Based on the Court's holding that the challenged em-
ployment practices need not be essential or indispensable to the defend-
ant's business goals, a defendant can easily meet its rebuttal burden,
regardless of the basis for the plaintiff's disparate-impact claim.
Even if a defendant rebuts a plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff
may still prevail if able to propose an alternative business practice which
will serve the employer's business interests equally well,"c but, according
to the Wards Cove majority, cost and other burdens to the employer are
relevant considerations in this determination.3 1' Proposing an alterna-
tive salary system based upon the theory of comparable worth rather
than the competitive labor market will always involve increased costs to
the employer in the form of increased wages.3"2 Furthermore, the Wards
Cove majority explicitly cautioned that courts are less competent than
employers to restructure business practices, warning that the judiciary
should proceed with care before mandating the use of an employment
practice offered by a disparate-impact plaintiff °3 0 3 Considering these fac-
296. IML at 2133 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 2125-26. According to the Wards Cove majority, the burden of persuasion in a
disparate-impact case remains at all times with the plaintiff. Id. at 2126. This means the
employer can rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by merely producing evidence of a business
necessity, whether or not such rebuttal evidence persuades the trier of fact that the articulated
business necessity was the employer's real motivation behind the challenged employment
practice.
298. Id. at 2126.
299. Id
300. Id. at 2126-27.
301. Id at 2127.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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tors, a court is unlikely to mandate the adoption of a comparable-worth
salary system to replace one based on the competitive market.
V. PROPOSAL: CONGRESS MUST AMEND TITLE VII TO ENSURE
THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF DISPARATE-IMPACT CLAIMS
As the United States Supreme Court stated in earlier cases, Title
VII's prohibition against employment discrimination was intended to
proscribe both overt discrimination, and employment practices that are
fair in form but discriminatory in application. 3" By the Court's own
admission, Congress directed the thrust of Title VII at the consequences
of employment discrimination, not merely the motivation.3 °0
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,3" 6 which gave birth to the disparate-im-
pact theory of liability, was decided in 1971. Title VII was amended in
1972.3"7 The amendment process gave Congress an opportunity to legis-
late against the disparate-impact cause of action if lawmakers disagreed
with the Griggs opinion. The 1972 changes made by Congress to Title
VII were slight and did not address the disparate-impact cause of ac-
tion.3"' Therefore, the nearly two decades of congressional silence since
the Griggs decision should be interpreted to mean that Congress endorses
the disparate-impact cause of action.
Additional indications that Congress endorses the disparate-impact
cause of action come from the congressional discussions surrounding the
1972 amendment to Title VII. During these discussions, both houses of
Congress acknowledged that existing case law would continue to govern
Title VII's implementation.3 °9 Decisional law at the time of the 1972
amendment included Griggs, as well as other cases involving disparate-
impact claims.310
The majority's decision in Wards Cove judicially eliminates the dis-
parate-impact cause of action by placing an unusually harsh burden of
proof on disparate-impact plaintiffs, while significantly lessening the bur-
304. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
305. Id at 432.
306. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
307. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)).
308. The 1972 amendment to Title VII merely added "applicants for employment" follow-
ing "his employees" in § 8(a), and added "or applicants for membership" following "member-
ship" in § 8(b). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (historical note).
309. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 24, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137.
310. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424. See also United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652
(2d Cir. 1971).
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den placed on disparate-impact defendants. It is simply impossible to
reconcile the Wards Cove decision with prior Title VII case law or a fair
reading of the congressional intent behind the enactment of Title VII.311
By collapsing disparate-impact and disparate-treatment theories into one
analysis, the Court has interpreted Title VII in the narrowest possible
manner.312 Congress must act to remedy the harm this decision will in-
evitably do. Congress must either amend Title VII to include a dispa-
rate-impact cause of action or, at the very least, add a policy statement
which makes it unquestionably clear that Title VII is not merely in-
tended to prevent overt acts of intentional discrimination. For example,
Congress could amend Title VII to state:
All forms of employment discrimination, whether or not inten-
tional, are prohibited by this Title. This includes any form of
wage discrimination which favors one gender over another, or
any other form of discrimination which is facially neutral but
has a disparate-impact on workers protected by this Title.
Remedies developed to implement this Title should be applied
flexibly, so as not to undermine its remedial goals.
Presently, a bipartisan coalition exists to overturn Wards Cove
through the passage of a bill entitled the Civil Rights Act of 1990.313
This bill seeks to restore the burdens of proof in disparate-impact cases,
311. See supra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
312. Title VII states that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individ-
ual in the employment context on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). This Title does not specifically state that it prohibits the conse-
quences of unintentional as well as intentional discrimination. Id. The narrowest interpreta-
tion of Title VII is to limit its reach to overt acts of employment discrimination only.
313. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The portion of the bill pertaining to Wards Cove
states:
SEC. 4. RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE IMPACT
CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN DISPARATE IMPACT
CASES.-
(1) An unlawful employment practice is established under this subsection
when-
(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an employment practice re-
sults in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex
or national origin, and the respondent fails to demonstrate that
such practice is required by business necessity; or
(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employment
practices results in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to demon-
strate that such practices are required by business necessity, except
that-
(i) if a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employ-
ment practices results in a disparate impact, such party shall
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impliedly endorsing the disparate-impact cause of action. The bill sends
a clear message to the Supreme Court that the type of judicial activism
demonstrated in Wards Cove will not go unnoticed. Without such a clear
message, the Court might continue to use its power of judicial review to
construe Title VII so narrowly that it becomes an ineffective tool.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current federal law does not explicitly provide a way to remedy pay
inequities between men and women for comparable work. While Title
VII provides equal access to the job market,3" 4 and the Equal Pay Act
ensures that men and women performing the same work receive equal
pay,31 1 these laws do not remedy the low value society places on work
performed predominantly by women.316 Recognizing Title VII chal-
lenges based on the doctrine of comparable worth is a viable way to rem-
edy this gap in the law. Admittedly, it is difficult to accurately affix a
value to work which is not equal, but merely comparable. Even so, some
states have surmounted this problem and currently set salaries for state
employees based on a system of comparable worth.317
A majority of the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the
comparable-worth issue. Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated that all wage
discrimination claims should be judged by the Equal Pay Act's standard
of equal pay for equal work.318 He has expressed the belief that Title VII
was not meant to remedy all forms of employment discrimination, 319 and
that some types of wage discrimination are acceptable, to lessen the bur-
not be required to demonstrate which specific practice or prac-
tices within the group results in such disparate impact; and
(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
practice within such group of employment practices does not
contribute to the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be
required to demonstrate that such practice is required by busi-
ness necessity.
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business
necessity may be used as a defense only against a claim under this
subsection.
Id.
314. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
315. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988). See also Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 200
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
316. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
317. See American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985). See also WASH. REV. CODE- ANN. §§ 41.06.150-.155, 28B.16.116
(1989).
318. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 200 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 203 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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dens associated with governmental intervention into business.32°
Although none of the other current Supreme Court Justices overtly sub-
scribe to this view, a majority of the Court has taken the more indirect
approach of so limiting the disparate-impact cause of action that only
overt acts of discrimination can survive the prima facie burden imposed
by the Wards Cove decision.
The Wards Cove decision establishes a highly formalistic standard
for disparate-impact claims. This standard is inconsistent with the na-
ture of most disparate-impact claims, particularly those based on the
doctrine of comparable worth. The very nature of a comparable-worth
claim requires that courts reject an overly formalistic approach to Title
VII, in favor of a realistic look at the persistent problem of wage discrim-
ination against women.321 Pay equity is more than just a salary issue. In
our society, money means power, and until women receive a wage equal
to that received by men, women will continue to remain in an inferior
power position within the workplace.322
Nancy L. Tetreault *
320. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist believes that the Equal Pay Act should pro-
vide the only remedy for sex-based wage discrimination. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
321. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
322. Steinberg, A Want of Harmony: Perspectives on Wage Discrimination and Comparable
Worth, in JUDICIAL WAGE DETERMINATION... A VOLATILE SPECTRE: PERSPECTIVES ON
COMPARABLE WORTH 24 (1984).
* In Memory of my father, Richard C. McWhinnie, 1926-1990. Special thanks to my
husband Paul, my mother Lorraine, and my sisters, Kimberly, Kerry and Liann.
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